Threat Intelligence Update 06 Dec - 11 Dec 2024 TLP: CLEAR
- Elemendar

- Dec 13, 2024
- 16 min read
This report was processed and collated by the Elemendar CTI team and includes Mitre ATT&CK TTPS and IOCs collated from using one of our products; READ., an AI-driven Cybersecurity tool.
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Contents
Russian APT BlueAlpha Exploits Cloudflare Tunneling to Deliver Malware Threat Actors Exploit Fake Meeting Apps to Steal Cryptocurrency and Sensitive Data from Web3 Professionals
Executive Summary
Newly Identified Malware Steals Credentials for 77 Financial Applications
A Remote Access Trojan (RAT) named DroidBot has been targeting banking and cryptocurrency apps on Android. Despite a basic design, it uses a dual channel communication model that uses MQTT and HTTPS for C2. Analysis of its files indicates DroidBot’s developers are intending an expansion from Eastern Europe into Latin America.
It is likely that DroidBot will expand into Latin America to test its systems in a region with weak cyber security and with a particular risk to RATs. It is likely that dual channel communication will become increasingly common in malware to defeat HTTPS based C2 countermeasures.
Russian APT BlueAlpha Exploits Cloudflare Tunneling to Deliver Malware
BlueAlpha has used the Cloudflare tunneling services to target Ukrainian organisations. The use of Cloudflare has allowed BlueAlpha to obfuscate its C2 communications and hide its malware dropper from security architecture. In addition, BlueAlpha has utilised the HTML smuggling TTP as a means to its dropper within email attachments.
It is likely that BlueAlpha’s use of Cloudflare to decrease the likelihood of detection. It is likely these TTPs will be employed again in the next 3-6 months, however there is a realistic possibility that these tactics will proliferate amongst other threat actors and spread geographically.
Threat Actors Exploit Fake Meeting Apps to Steal Cryptocurrency and Sensitive Data from Web3 Professionals
Threat actors targeting Web3 users employ fake video conferencing platforms, like "Meeten," to distribute the Realst malware, stealing cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, banking data, and more.
Leveraging AI-generated content for legitimacy, social engineering tactics, and advanced malware, these campaigns exploit high-value assets in Web3, are almost certain to pose a significant financial and operational threats globally.
Newly Identified Malware Steals Credentials for 77 Financial Applications

A new Android Remote Access Trojan (RAT) has been observed stealing credentials from banking apps and cryptocurrency exchanges across Europe. The malware, named “DroidBot” has so far been identified as successfully stealing credentials from 77 apps with 776 unique infections in the UK, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. The initial analysis of DroidBot indicates it is being sold on an unnamed platform as part of a Malware as a Service (MaaS) with 17 threat actors collaborating on it.
Elemendar CTI Analyst comment: CTI research indicated that DroidBot has been available for purchase since June 2024 and selling at a $3000 USD monthly subscription. Files within DroidBot are written in Turkish and files are timestamped at Ankara’s timezone. Translated files also indicate plans that the developers intend an expansion into Latin America (LATAM). LATAM is regularly used as a testing ground for proof of concept and TTPs due to its cyber security measures in multiple industries, including banking and finances, being below those seen in North America and Europe. Comment Ends
DroidBot operates both a Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol and overlay attack techniques to enable remote access by the attacker and deceive users into unsafe actions respectively. This enables DroidBot to conduct SMS interception, key-logging and screen interaction. DroidBot does not show largescale technical deviations from other RATs on Android. However, Droidbot notably operates a dual-channel communication protocol utilising Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) for outbound communication and HTTPS for inbound communications.
Elemendar CTI Analyst Comment: RAT communication on Android tends to utilise HTTPS for both outbound and inbound communications. HTTPS has seen a spike in usage since 2020, due to increasing digitisation in workforces creating exploitation opportunities for threat actors to use HTTPS. However, this has led to the increase in countermeasures being developed to combat HTTPS communicating malware. MQTT is commonly associated with IoT environments and Botnets and is not usually associated with RAT communication. However, over the past 12 months its use has been noted in other banking trojans including Copybara and BRATA/AMEXTroll. Comment Ends.
Elemendar Intelligence Assessment: DroidBot’s technical specifications, price and known target list suggest it is highly likely designed at present to target small to medium sized financial institutions. Its less advanced technical specifications would likely be detected by security solutions more commonly seen in larger, risk aware organisations. DroidBot’s use of dual channel communication is highly likely an attempt to obfuscate its communications and presence to evade less advanced security measures.
The use of MQTT, an uncommon malware communication language on Android, is highly likely to increase DroidBot’s attractiveness to threat actors wishing to evade the increasingly successful HTTPS based countermeasures. This feature is highly likely to increase its attractiveness to threat actors as it is likely to have a greater chance of success than similar malware such as njRAT and NanoCore RAT.
It is likely that DroidBot will expand outside of Europe into LATAM and target regional banking and cryptocurrencies in that region. It is likely this move is to test and adapt DroidBot’s features. Its relatively early development and less advanced systems are likely to have a greater chance of success in LATAM.
It is likely that dual channel communication will become an increasingly used TTP for threat actors over the next 12-18 months to mitigate the increasing countermeasures against HTTPS based malware communication. Assessment Ends.
Russian APT BlueAlpha Exploits Cloudflare Tunneling to Deliver Malware

Russian state-sponsored APT, BlueAlpha has been identified using new TTPs to conceal its infrastructure and mask its malware delivery from security measures. Cloudflare tunnels are being used by the APT to obfuscate detection and conceal its servers true location, masking their GammaDrop staging infrastructure from network detection mechanisms. The use of the tunnels can also mask its C2 communications once the malware has been delivered to the target.
Elemendar CTI Analyst Comment: BlueAlpha (aka Gamaredon, Shuckworm, Hive0051 and UNC530) has been operational since 2014. It has operated primarily against Ukrainian targets since the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict following the Russian invasion in 2022. Comment Ends
In addition, BlueAlpha has been seen embedding JavaScript in HTML attachments in emails sent out in phishing campaigns. Written within the HTML is the GammaDrop malware. Again, this obfuscates BlueAlpha’s activity by enabling the malicious code to evade email security filters.
Elemendar CTI Analyst Comment: GammaDrop is a dropper which once infected onto a system writes the GammaLoad malware onto the affected device's disk thereby increasing the likelihood of persistence. GammaLoad is a custom loader which is used to beacon back to the C2 node and can execute additional malware. GammaLoad is notable for using VBScript in its malware, a common scripting language used for automating tasks in Windows. This has allowed it previously to leverage built-in Windows functionalities and increases the difficulty for network security to detect its presence. BlueAlpha has used GammaDrop and GammaLoad since 2023 to target Ukrainian organisations. The functions of GammaLoad that have been employed by BlueAlpha include credential theft, data exfiltration and to maintain a persistent access to targeted networks. Comment ends.
Elemendar Intelligence Assessment: It is highly likely that BlueAlpha will continue to utilise legitimate services as part of its attacks. The use of such services is almost certain to make detection harder especially for less advanced security systems.
Using legitimate services to obfuscate malicious activity is likely a response to increased security apparatus and as such it is likely to become a common feature of other Russian sponsored groups in the next 3-6 months.
It is likely that the primary target for BlueAlpha will be Ukrainian organisations, however there is a realistic possibility that such a TTP will proliferate to other threat actors that may cause it to spread geographically. Such TTPs are almost certain to still require user interaction to infect the network. Assessment ends.
Threat Actors Exploit Fake Meeting Apps to Steal Cryptocurrency and Sensitive Data from Web3 Professionals

Threat actors are targeting Web3 users through fake video conferencing platforms, posing as legitimate meeting software, to distribute the Realst information-stealing malware.
Elemendar CTI Analyst comment: Web3 is used by a diverse group including developers, cryptocurrency enthusiasts, investors, artists, gamers, entrepreneurs, privacy advocates, institutions, governments, and general consumers, attracted by its decentralised, user-centric approach to blockchain technology and digital interactions.Dubbed "Meeten," by cybersecurity research at Cado Security Labs, this campaign has been active since September 2024, targeting both Windows and macOS users under the guise of fake business meetings. Threat actors are known to frequently rebrand the fake meeting software, previously operating under names such as "Clusee," "Cuesee," "Meetone," and "Meetio." Comment Ends.
Threat actors create realistic websites and social media profiles for fake brands (such as “Meetio”) using AI-generated content to increase credibility. Victims are approached through social engineering tactics, such as phishing or impersonating trusted contacts on platforms like Telegram. After establishing contact, targets are encouraged to download the malicious "meeting app" from these fraudulent sites. Once installed, the malware targets various sensitive data, including:
Cryptocurrency wallets (Ledger, Trezor, Phantom, and Binance)
Browser credentials (autofill data, cookies, and history from Chrome, Opera, Brave, and others)
Banking information
Telegram credentials
macOS Keychain credentials
In addition to the malware, the Meeten websites use JavaScript to steal cryptocurrency stored in browsers, even before the malware is installed.

Fig. 01: One of the Websites spreading Realst stealer (Source: Cado)
On macOS, the malware prompts victims to enter their system password via the 'osascript' tool, granting attackers elevated privileges. Following this, a decoy error message is displayed while data is stealthily exfiltrated in the background.
On Windows, the malware disguises itself as a digitally signed installer, using advanced techniques such as Electron apps and Rust-based binaries to evade detection. It establishes persistence through registry modifications and exfiltrates sensitive information to attacker-controlled domains.
Elemendar CTI Analyst comment: Key observations include the use of AI-generated content to create convincing websites, enhancing the legitimacy of the campaign. The Realst malware demonstrates sophisticated evolution, building on earlier stealer malware like Atomic macOS Stealer and Rhadamanthys, showcasing continuous innovation. The Meeten campaign is part of a larger trend of using fake meeting platforms to distribute malware. Previous examples include the Markopolo campaign, which deployed stealer malware like Stealc and Rhadamanthys to target cryptocurrency users, and the Meethub.gg campaign, which propagated malware with overlaps to Realst in March 2024. Comment Ends.
Elemendar Intelligence Assessment: The threat actors responsible for this latest campaign leveraged targeted social engineering tactics, such as impersonation via Telegram and other platforms, to gain the trust of their victims and in doing so, lure individuals into downloading malicious software. Coercing the user to download the malware bypasses security solutions which in turn, allows the threat actor to evade detection, escalate privileges to exfiltrate data efficiently.
Web3 is utilised by a broad church of users, this campaign has been constructed to exploit high-value assets and sensitive data, enabling scalable operations. Attacks against Web3 users are significant due to its role in decentralised technologies like blockchain, cryptocurrency, and DeFi, which hold substantial financial value. Breaches exploit high-value assets, disrupt global markets, and harm investor trust. Web3’s decentralised nature and unique security challenges amplify the impact, and is likely to lead to irreparable financial losses. Assessment Ends.
Annex A: References
Newly Identified Malware Steals Credentials for 77 Financial Applications https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-droidbot-android-malware-targets-77-banking-crypto-apps/
Russian APT BlueAlpha Exploits Cloudflare Tunneling to Deliver Malware https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-ru-2024-1205.pdf
Threat Actors Exploit Fake Meeting Apps to Steal Cryptocurrency and Sensitive Data from Web3 Professionals
Annex B: STIX Entities
Newly Identified Malware Steals Credentials for 77 Financial Applications
Mitre ATT&CK TTPs / Attack Procedures
Russian APT BlueAlpha Exploits Cloudflare Tunneling to Deliver Malware
Mitre ATT&CK TTPs / Attack Procedures
Threat Actors Exploit Fake Meeting Apps to Steal Cryptocurrency and Sensitive Data from Web3 Professionals
Mitre ATT&CK TTPs / Attack Procedures
IOCS
Probability Language
This document uses probability language based on assessment. Further information can be found in the image below:

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Acknowledgements
Authored by
Paul Montgomery, CTI Director Elemendar
Matt Orwin, CTI Analyst



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